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I. INTRODUCTION
During the past presidential campaign, President George Bush
asked the American people to "read my lips"1 in an effort to convince
the electorate of his position on a tax increase. In 1989 the Florida
appellate courts employed the same strategy to convince the legislature
and the lower courts of their apparent failure to cause Florida's juve-
nile justice and child welfare system to deal effectively with the state's
delinquent and dependent children.
During the 1990 session, the legislature responded at least in part,
making substantial changes in the juvenile delinquency provisions of
Florida's children's code when it passed the Juvenile Justice Reform
Act of 1990.2 On the other hand, a review of the appellate opinions
decided through September 30, 1990,3 suggests that the trial courts
were not reading the lips of the appellate judges. For example, in the
twelve month period between October 1, 1988 and September 30, 1989,
the intermediate appellate courts wrote seventeen separate opinions re-
versing the lower courts for failure to comply with statutory provisions
requiring consideration of six criteria when determining if a child is
suitable for sentencing and sanctioning as an adult, as opposed to dis-
position in the juvenile justice system after waiver or certification of the
child to adult court and subsequent conviction there.4 This past year
there were eleven additional reported opinions dealing with the same
* Professor of Law, Nova University, Shepard Broad Law Center; B.A., 1967
Colgate University; J.D., 1970 Boston College.
1. Speech by George Bush, then Presidential Candidate, at the Republican Nat'l
Convention (Aug. 18, 1988).
2. FLA. STAT. §§ 39.001-.516 (Supp. 1990). The legislature also passed The
Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act of 1990, FLA. STAT. § 874 (Supp.
1990), and the Juvenile Delinquency and Gang Prevention Act of 1990, FLA. STAT. §
39.025 (Supp. 1990).
3. This survey will cover the time period from October 1, 1989, to September 30,
1990. Appellate cases involving generic criminal and evidentiary issues are beyond the
scope of this article unless the issue is unique to juvenile law. A detailed analysis of
new legislation is also outside the purview of this article.
4. See infra notes 146-154 and accompanying text.
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technical issue.
The legislature's response to the perceived problems in the juvenile
justice field did not carry over substantially to child welfare.5 And even
in the juvenile justice arena, recent events suggest that resolution of the
problems under the new delinquency statute may be difficult to achieve.
A central component of the new statute is the appropriaticn of substan-
tial state funds which, at the time of this writing, are in jeopardy be-
cause of the state's projected revenue shortfall.6
This article will survey the case law in both the juvenile justice
and child welfare areas of juvenile law since September, 1989.7 The
survey is divided into two sections: Juvenile Delinquency and Depen-
dency.' The survey will not include a discussion of status offender pro-
ceedings because, for the second year in succession, there have been no
reported opinions interpreting the now two year-old .Part IV of the Act
which governs families in need of services and children in need of
services.'
5. The Legislature did pass the "William and Budd Bell Preven.ion and Protec-
tion Act," which made a number of specific changes in the dependency and termination
of parental rights parts of Chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes. See FLA STAT. § 39.002
(1990).
6. See Chiles Tries to Spread the Pain, But Human Services Hurt the Most,
Editorial, Fort Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel, Jan. 12, 1991, at 22A; Law Maker Urges
State Income Tax to Boost Ailing Social Services Agency, Fort Lauderdale Sun-Senti-
nel, February 3, 1991, at 6B; Chiles Plan Would Cut Broward Child Services, Miami
Herald, Jan. 10, 1991, at IA (Broward Ed.).
7. Appellate opinions which raise no significant issues of general significance will
not be discussed.
8. The Florida Juvenile Justice Act, located at Chapter 39 of the Florida Stat-
utes, is divided into six sections. Relevant here are Part II governing delinquency mat-
ters, Part III governing dependency matters and Part VI governing termination of pa-
rental rights.
9. HRS has produced regulations governing such proceedings3. FLA. ADMIN.
CODE 1OM-28 (Families in Need of Services). HRS has also begur, the process of
contracting out a full continuum of CINS/FINS services to private providers under a
five year plan to achieve a full continuum of services. Letter from Ana M. Villar, Sen-
ior Human Services Program Specialist, HRS, March 22, 1991. For an overview of
Part IV of Chapter 39 governing CINS/FINS, see Dale, 1988 Survey of Florida Law:
Juvenile Law, 13 NOVA L. REV. 1166, 1190-93 (1989) [hereinafter 1988 Survey].
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II. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
A. Detention
When a child is taken into custody-the equivalent of an adult
arrest-and charged with an act of delinquency, Florida's statute, like
those in most states, allows the child to go home, be placed in non-
secure detention or be held in secure detention. 10 Florida's approach to
detention has changed dramatically on several occasions over the past
decade. For example, prior to 1981 Florida had relatively narrow de-
tention criteria." The law was rewritten in 1981 to substantially ex-
pand the grounds upon which a child could be held in secure deten-
tion. 2 The new law narrows the grounds again.
Under current and prior law, when placed in detention "[n]o child
shall be held in non-secure or secure detention care or a crisis home
under a special detention order for more than 21 days unless an adjudi-
catory hearing for the case has been commenced by the court."' 3 The
appellate courts have issued a substantial number of opinions over the
past two years reversing trial court orders that violate the 21 day
rule.' 4 Indeed, the courts became so concerned that in J.F. v. Johnson'5
the Fourth District admonished a particular trial court that, given its
repeated failure to comply with orders to comply with the 21 day rule,
the trial court might find itself outside the limits of judicial immunity.
Over the past year, the failure to comply with the rule continued.
In R.C. v. Fryer,'" the Fourth District Court of Appeal reported that
the trial court had even suggested the possibility that the appeals court
itself would invite the child to bring suit against the trial judge for
refusing to release the child. Referring to its earlier decision in J.F. v.
10. FLA. STAT. § 39.044 (Supp. 1990).
11. Brummer & Levine, Incarcerating Children for Their Own Good: Florida's
Pre-Trial Detention Practices Revisited, 60 FLA. B.J. 17 (1986).
12. 1981 Fla. Laws 218, § 5, recodified as amended at FLA. STAT. § 39.032
(1981) (repealed 1990). See Dale, 1989 Survey of Florida Law: Juvenile Law, 14
NOVA L. REV. 859, 865 (1990) [hereinafter 1989 Survey]; Brummer & Levine, supra
note 11; Levine, Juvenile Justice in Florida: Bringing Rehabilitation Back Into Soci-
ety, 8 NOVA L. J. 255, 260 (1984).
13. FLA. STAT. § 39.032(6)(b) (1989), repealed by FLA. STAT. § 39.044(5)(b)
(Supp. 1990).
14. See Dale, 1989 Survey, supra note 12, at 866-868 (discussing the cases de-
cided in 1989).
15. 543 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
16. 561 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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Johnson, in which it admonished the same trial court judge, the appel-
late court concluded, "continued and intentional disregard of the gov-
erning statutes by this trial judge will certainly invite harm to the trial
judge, as well as to the reputation of our courts and judicial system.' 17
On the same day, the Fourth District ruled in L.J. v. Fryer i that the
trial court could not retroactively and sua sponte continue detention
which had gone beyond the 21 day period on the ground that the
child's parents had failed to provide an attorney to represent the boy.
The court ruled that this did not constitute good cause to extend the 21
day limit.19 The court held further that the trial court's belief that the
child was represented by the public defender's office did not change the
result.20 Represented or not, the child was entitled to be released from
detention. When the detention period under the statute runs out, the
trial court lacks jurisdiction to extend the original detention. 1
Finally, in D.M. v. Korda,12 the court granted another writ of
habeas corpus relating to continued detention ordered by -:he same trial
judge. The appellate court stated: "Unfortunately, for reasons beyond
our comprehension, and despite this court's opinions in J.F. and in P.R.
v. Johnson, this pattern continues. Even with the purest intentions and
sentiments, no judge may put himself above the law." '23
It then explained that while judicial immunity may exist for
money damages, it is not a bar to claims for injunctive relief against
the judge or to an award of attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the
Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Award Act.24 The court concluded, "[w]e
will leave such considerations to the discretion of those parties who
may consider such claims in the future, should the particular division
continue to refuse to confine its rulings to the governing laws."' 25
17. Id.
18. 565 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
19. Id. at 713 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.032(6)(d) (1990)).
20. Id. at 714.
21. Id.
22. 562 So. 2d 407 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990). In prior reported opinions on
this issue, the appellate court removed the name of the judge sua sponte and substi-
tuted the name of the superintendent of the detention center. This time it did not. See
L.J. v, Fryer, 565 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990); R.C. v. Fryer, 561 So.2d
31 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
23. 562 So. 2d at 408 (citation omitted).
24. Id.
25. Id.; see also Dale, 1989 Survey, supra note 12, at 868 (discussing the limits
of judicial immunity).
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In E.W. v. Brown,26 the First District Court of Appeal was faced
with a question of interpretation of the good cause exception to the 21-
day detention rule. The state's attorney argued that good cause to ex-
tend detention is met when the state establishes the need for continua-
tion of the original detention. The appellate court disagreed, holding
what seems obvious - good cause relates to the reason for the delay in
the commencement of the adjudicatory hearing process.17 Thus, if the
state can show that its investigation was incomplete or that a witness
could not be found, it may seek an extension of detention. However,
such is not the case when the basis for extension is the original justifi-
cation for detention. 8
In C.S. v. Brown,2 a question of first impression concerning the
21-day rule arose. The child had been detained on various charges, and
on the 21st day of his detention, the state filed an information against
him as an adult. The court determined that the filing of the informa-
tion removed the child from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court for
the purposes of pre-trial detention. Thus, the state was obligated to
bring this child before a judge sitting in the criminal division for an
initial appearance under the rules of criminal procedure. 30 To do other-
wise, the court reasoned, would permit the state to extend the child's
period of deprivation of liberty without adequate procedural safe-
guards.-1 It found that the juvenile authorities lacked the ability to con-
tinue holding the child. The court concluded that if the state did not
bring the youngster before a judicial official for a first appearance
within 24 hours of the time the information was filed, the child would
be entitled to release by the juvenile authorities.-2
B. Adjudicatory Issues
Section 39.05(6), Florida Statutes, now renumbered as section
26. 559 So. 2d 712 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
27. Id. at 713.
28. Id.
29. 553 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
30. Id. at 319; see FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.131, 3.132.
31. 553 So. 2d at 317 (citing P.R. v. Johnson, 541 So. 2d 791, 793 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1989)). The court also relied upon Rule 8.150 of the Florida Rules of
Juvenile Procedure, which provides specific procedures in order to waive jurisdiction of
the juvenile court and to certify the case for trial as if the child were an adult. FLA. R.
Juv. P. 8.150.
32. 553 So. 2d at 319.
Dale 1173
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39.048(6), provides that a petition must be filed within 45 days of the
time the child is taken into custody."3 The courts in the past year have
been faced with several appeals relating to interpretations of the 45 day
rule. For example, in W.G.K. v. State, 4 while the original petition was
filed within 45 days, the state named the wrong victim, and then filed
an amended petition changing the name of the victim after the 45 day
period had run. The court concluded that the situation was controlled
by J.H. v. State,"5 and therefore, the adjudication of delinquency had
to be reversed.
The question of when the 45 day period begins to run was raised
in In Interest of S.V.36 The child, a suspect in a series of burglaries,
voluntarily surrendered to the police. He was then arrested for several
but not all of the burglaries. The state waited almost five months to file
a probable cause affidavit and almost six months to file a petition alleg-
ing delinquency as to the burglary which was the subject of the appeal.
The court held that while the child voluntarily surrendered himself to
the police months earlier, they did not arrest him for the specific
charge which was the subject of the appeal. Thus, 45 days had not run
from the time the youngster was taken into custody omi the instant
charges to the time the delinquency petition was filed. 37
It is possible for a juvenile to waive the 45 day time period. In
R.F.R. v. State,3 8 the child expressly and voluntarily waived his right
to have the petition filed in 45 days in exchange for a plea agreement
in which the state would place him in a youth diversionary program. 39
When the child failed to comply with the diversionary program agree-
ment, the state attorney filed a delinquency petition. The child's motion
to dismiss on the ground that the petition was filed beyond the 45 day
33. Section 39.05 of the 1989 Florida Statutes states:
On motions by or on behalf of a child, a petition alleging delinquency shall
be dismissed with prejudice if it was not filed within 45 days of the date
the child was taken into custody. The court may grant an extension of
time, not to exceed an additional 15 days, upon such motion as by the state
attorney for good cause shown.
FLA. STAT. § 39.05(6) (1989) recodified at FLA. STAT. § 39.048(b) (Supp. 1990).
34. 565 So. 2d 885 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
35. 424 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (filing of a defective original
petition, because it named the wrong party, does not toll the running of the 45 day
period. Thus, an amended petition not timely filed is invalid).
36. 560 So. 2d 402 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
37. Id. at 403.
38. 558 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
39. Id. at 1085.
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limit was denied. The First District held that the child should not be
allowed to agree to an alternative disposition, wait for the 45 days in
which a petition could be filed to pass, and then refuse to comply with
the conditions of the alternative program. ° Such a result is neither fair
nor logical. This was a reciprocal and interdependent compact."' On
appeal the child argued that the waiver was not expressly provided for
by statute.42 Thus, he argued, waiver was foreclosed as an option. The
appellate court disagreed as a matter of statutory interpretation.
In M.F. v. State,43 the child claimed that the delinquency petition
should have been dismissed because the amended petition, which was
filed more than 45 days after he was taken into custody, alleged an
entirely new charge. The amendment changed the type of controlled
substance the child was charged with selling, delivering, or possessing
with intent to sell, from cannabis to cocaine. Finding that the child was
not prejudiced in the preparation of his defense, the court held that
unlike a criminal case, in a juvenile delinquency proceeding, the child
is not convicted of a crime. Therefore, he was adequately informed of
the charges against him when he was charged with the sale and deliv-
ery of a controlled substance. This information was enough to toll the
statutory filing period.45
The Second District Court of Appeal was faced with a similar
problem in State v. M.M.46 There, a child was charged with being a
40. Id.
41. If this were not such a compact, the rehabilitative purpose of the Juvenile
Code would be lost. Id. at 1086 n.3 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.001(2)(a) (1989) (amended
1990)) ("substituting for retributive punishment, whenever possible, methods of of-
fender rehabilitation"). The section was substantially rewritten in 1990 and the rele-
vant provision, section 39.001(c), states:
(c) To assure due process for each child, balanced with the state's
interest in the protection of society, by substituting methods of prevention,
early intervention, diversion, offender rehabilitation, treatment, community
services, and restitution in money or in kind for retributive punishment,
whenever possible, and by providing intensive treatment sanctions only
when most appropriate, recognizing that sanctions which are consistent
with the seriousness of the act committed and focus on treatment should
be applied in cases where necessary efforts have been made to divert the
child from the juvenile justice system.
FLA. STAT. § 39.001(c) (Supp. 1990).
42. R.F.R., 558 So. 2d at 1085.
43. 563 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
44. Id. at 172.
45. Id.
46. 557 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
Dale 1175
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principal to sexual battery. Subsequently, and outside the 45 day pe-
riod, the state filed amended petitions against the child charging him
with two additional counts of kidnapping and aggravated assault.4 7 The
appellate court concluded that the two amended petitions were a con-
tinuation of the initial petition, and therefore, the trial court's dismissal
of the petitions was in error.4 8 The court suggested two rationales for
upholding the amended petitions. First, they did not mislead the child
or prejudice the preparation of the defense as would have occurred
where the victim's name was misstated as in Interest of W.G.K.49 Sec-
ond, where the amended charges arise from the same factual situation
and where there is no showing of prejudice by the change, the amend-
ment will be allowed.50
In late 1988 the Florida Supreme Court changed the juvenile rule
of procedure concerning speedy trials to match the criminal rules. 1 In
State v. A.H., the Second District had an opportunity to interpret the
speedy trial rule.52 In that case, the defense requested discovery of the
informant and a tape recording in a case involving the sale of .1 gram
of rock cocaine to a confidential informant who was wearing a body
transmitter.5 3
When the defense demonstrated that the informant's testimony
conflicted with the testimony of the police officers who monitored the
drug transaction, it asked for a continuance to further depose the in-
formant. The court reset the hearing for a day after the time for expi-
ration under the speedy trial rules. The defense then moved for dis-
charge under the rule. The trial court granted the motion and the
Second District Court of Appeal reversed relying upon Rule
8.180(j)(3). That section provides that the state is allowed 10 days af-
47. Id. at 218.
48. Id.
49. Id.; see also J.H. v. State, 424 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
50. Id. (citing Interest of E.M., 362 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978)).
See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 15(e); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.190(c) (civil practice rules
known as the "relation back doctrine"). In a civil case, when the amended complaint
filed outside the statute of limitations alleges a cause of action arising out of a common
nucleus of operative fact with the original claim, the cause of action will relate back
and not violate the statute of limitations. See also United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383
U.S. 715 (1966).
51. See Dale, 1989 Survey, supra note 12, at 868; FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.180; FLA. R.
CGRIM. P. 3.191.
52. 550 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 1989).
53. Id. at 138-39.
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ter a hearing on a motion for discharge to bring the defendant to trial.
It was not given this opportunity and thus reversal was appropriate.5 4
In dicta, the court stated that the trial court has discretion to dismiss a
case if it finds that there has been an egregious discovery violation
which materially prejudices the defendant. However, the trial court did
not dismiss for this reason, but rather on the basis of the expiration of
the speedy trial time.5
A particularly sensitive discovery issue arose in B.E. v. State.5 1 In
that case a 14-year old child was charged with a lewd and lascivious
act upon a 3-year old girl. When the lawyer for the respondent sought
to take the three-year old's deposition, the trial court granted a protec-
tive order which not only precluded taking the deposition, but also for-
bade the lawyer from communicating with the child.57 The bases for
the denial were the unsworn representation of the prosecutor that the
child could not recount the events in question and thus would not be
called as a witness and the judge's personal feeling that no 3-year old
should be subjected to the legal process under any circumstance s.5 The
appellate court reversed on several grounds. First, it found that the
blanket preclusion violated the sixth amendment and article VI, section
16 of the Declaration of Rights of the Florida Constitution. 9 Second, it
held that the age of the child of tender years does not itself demon-
54. Id. at 139.
55. Id.; see also State v. A.J., 558 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990)(re-
versing a dismissal on discovery abuse grounds because there was no showing of
prejudice).
56. 564 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 567.
59. Article VI, section 16, of the Florida Constitution provides, "the accused
shall enjoy the right ... to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor." It is not altogether clear that a respondent in a juvenile delinquency proceeding
has sixth amendment rights. In a series of cases, the United States Supreme Court has
held that the juvenile delinquency proceeding is not a criminal prosecution so as to
implicate the protections in the Constitution that apply to adults in criminal cases. On
the other hand, the Court in these cases did hold that due process rights apply under
the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. Thus, it seems clear that
the respondent would have the right to confront his accuser as a constitutional matter
but under the due process clause. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971);
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Of course, even
then there are limitations. See, e.g., Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990)(limit-
ing defendants' sixth amendment rights to personally confront child accusers in sex
crime cases); B.E. v. State, 564 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990)(citing Coy v.
Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988)).
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strate lack of competency to testify. To the contrary, the court ex-
plained a body of Florida state law which suggests just the opposite. 60
The two judges assigned to the Fourth Judicial Circuit juvenile
court in 1990 had a general policy that all juveniles in secure detention
would be shackled at all times during court appearances. The policy
was challenged in S.Y. v. McMillan.61 The court denied a petition for a
writ of certiorari challenging the blanket system on the grounds that,
unlike adult cases involving the right to appear unshackled before a
jury, the child has no equivalent right.62 The appellate court concluded
further that the shackles were limited to juveniles being detained and
took into consideration the trial court testimony of the chief bailiff in
which he said that the use of shackles had a positive effect on the se-
curity and decorum of the courtroom. Additionally, he said that fights
among the juveniles and escape attempts had decreased. It is not clear
from the opinion whether any documentary evidence was presented. 63
The public defender argued on appeal that appearing in shackles vio-
lates the presumption of innocence. The court ruled that the lack of a
jury in a juvenile delinquency case was a significant distinguishing fac-
tor.6 4 The court, however, failed to mention decisions in other jurisdic-
tions, including cases involving juveniles in which the courts ruled that
the question of security was an individualized one.65
The more appropriate question was whether the particular child
was likely to create a security risk as balanced against the substantial
bias which might be created by the appearance of a child in court in
shackles. There is no explanation in the S.Y. opinion as to why only
children held in detention rather than all children charged are shackled
other than the assertion that detained children meet the statutory de-
tention criteria.66 Nor is there any explanation as to why this procedure
60. B.E., 564 So. 2d at 568 (providing relevant cases).
61. 563 So. 2d 807 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
62. Id. at 808. Although the court cited to no case in this regard, the Supreme
Court has distinguished between the constitutional rights of adults versus those of
juveniles. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
63. 563 So. 2d at 808-09.
64. Id.
65. See In re Staley, 67 I1l. 2d 33, 364 N.E.2d 72 (1977); In re Brown 45 Ill.
App. 3d 24, 358 N.E.2d 1362 (11. App. Ct. 1977).
66. It is not clear what conclusion the court was drawing. Perhaps it was sug-
gesting that detained children are more dangerous or are greater security risks. But see
Levine, supra note 12, at 255 (suggesting that the criteria are expansive and include
children charged with minor offenses). Nor did the court address whether any proce-
1178 [Vol. 15
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is not followed elsewhere in Florida. Finally, the use of shackles seems
to run counter to the spirit of the Florida Juvenile Justice Act.6 7
In what is hopefully a unique case, the Fifth District Court of Ap-
peal was asked to decide the question of whether a trial court could
refuse to allow the prosecution to put on evidence by dismissing a delin-
quency petition over the prosecution's objection at arraignment.6 8 The
appellate court held in State v. S.C. that the decision to charge rests
with the prosecutor, and until both sides have an opportunity to present
evidence, the court cannot make a proper decision to dismiss.69
Technical questions concerning application of protected constitu-
tional rights have recently come up on several occasions in the appel-
late courts. For example, the right to counsel, set out over 20 years ago
by the United States Supreme Court in In re Gault,70 has been ex-
panded by Florida statute so that the child shall be advised of his right
to counsel at a dispositional hearing. 71 In Interest of J. CS.,72 the trial
court failed to advise the child of the right to counsel 3 and the court of
appeal reversed.
A second technical matter which has come up frequently involves
a Florida Supreme Court rule requiring written consent to employment
of a certified law student intern which must be filed in the case and
brought to the attention of the trial judge.74 In Interest of L.S.,76 the
court reversed and remanded for a new adjudicatory hearing when the
dure or substantive due process rights were violated.
67. See generally FLA. STAT. § 39.001(2)(a)(b) (Supp. 1990).
68. State v. S.C., 558 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
69. Id. at 523.
70. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
71. FLA. STAT. § 39.041 (Supp. 1990) (child entitled to representation at all
stages of any proceedings). See FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.050(e)(1)(ii).
72. 560 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
73. Id. at 427. The court followed the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure which
provide:
Duty of the court. The court shall advise the child of the right to
counsel. The court shall appoint counsel as provided by law unless waived
by the child at each stage of the proceeding. This waiver shall be in writ-
ing if made at the time of a plea of guilty or no contest or at the adjudica-
tory hearing.
FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.290(a); see also B.I. v. State, 492 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1986).
74. RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR 11-1.2(d) (1987); see also Dale,
1989 Survey, supra note 12, at 863 (discussing earlier cases).
75. 560 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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record was shown to be insufficient to establish that the child under-
stood his legal options and that he knowingly waived the right to be
represented by a lawyer when he consented to be represented by a cer-
tified legal intern.7 6 In Interest of A.R., 77 exactly the same issue came
up when there was no evidence of a written consent to be represented
by the legal intern in the file. Of similar constitutional significance is
the requirement that the court determine that a guilty plea or a plea of
nolo contendere shall be freely, knowingly, and voluntarily tendered.78
In two separate cases the trial court had failed to undertake the appro-
priate plea colloquy and as a result, in C. W. v. State 9 and M.C. v.
State,"° the appellate court reversed and remanded for appropriate
proceedings.
Sixteen years ago the United States Supreme Court ruled that the
double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment, applied to the states
through the fourteenth amendment, also applies to juveniles. 81 In
D.L.V. v. Kirk,82 the Fifth District Court of Appeal granted a writ of
prohibition to prevent further proceedings in a delinquency case where
the state filed a petition alleging unlawful sale and delivery of cocaine
after a prior petition alleging the identical allegations was dismissed at
the adjudicatory hearing. At the hearing, the state was not prepared to
proceed and was unsuccessful in obtaining a continuance. The trial
court ruled on the first petition that the child was not delinquent as
charged. In a rather blunt opinion, the appeals court held that the or-
der of dismissal was a final order in the first case since the trial court
explicitly found that the child had not committed the act. The court
then added that the state's refiling of the petition was "a blatant at-
tempt to circumvent the court's final order of dismissal." 83
76. Id. at 425.
77. 554 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
78. See generally Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). Florida applies the
totality of circumstances test for waiver of counsel. See State v. Evans, 462 So. 2d 596
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985); State v. Cartwright, 448 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1984); Fields v. State, 402 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Hogan v.
State, 330 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
79. 554 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
80. 561 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
81. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975); see also Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S.
204 (1978); Dale, Children Before the Supreme Court: In Whose Best Interests? 53
ALB. L. REv. 513, 532-34 (1989)(discussing the two cases).
82. 551 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
83. Id.
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The First District Court of Appeal in K.Y.E. v. State, " recently
decided a first amendment free speech case. A child was adjudged to
have breached the peace and obstructed a police officer without vio-
lence when she continually sang an obscene epithet in the presence of
the police officer, which allegedly interrupted the officer's conversation
with another individual. Because the record disclosed no evidence that
the singing epithet evoked a response intending to inflict injury or incite
breach of the peace under Florida law, the court found no breach. 5
Therefore, it concluded that the speech and conduct were protected by
the first amendment.86
A recent case, Interest of D.D.,s7 iivolved a question of the consti-
tutionality of the serious habitual juvenile offender dispositional place-
ment statute."8 The specific issue was whether arrests are a proper cri-
terion to determine serious offender placement. Relying upon the
Florida Supreme Court opinion in State v. Potts,"9 which held that the
state may not penalize someone merely for the status of being under
indictment or otherwise accused of a crime, the appellate court ruled
that an arrest cannot be taken into account in setting sentencing guide-
lines for juveniles." The court concluded the arrest criteria violated
substantive due process under the fourteenth amendment as well as ar-
ticle 1, section 9 of the Florida Constitution.9"
C. Dispositional Issues
Florida's Juvenile Justice Act provides a variety of dispositional
84. 557 So. 2d 956 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
85. Id. at 957 (there was evidence that her singing was heard by others and
attracted curious on-lookers).
86. Id.
87. 564 So. 2d 1224 (Fla. 4th Dist.-Ct. App. 1990).
88. Section 39.01(47), Florida Statutes, provides:
(47) "Shelter" means a place for the temporary care of a child who is
alleged to be or who has been found to be dependent, a child from a family
in need of services, or a child in need of services, pending court disposition
before or after adjudication or after execution of a court order. "Shelter"
may include a facility which provides 24-hour continual supervision for the
temporary care of a child who is placed pursuant to s. 39.422.
FLA. STAT. § 39.01(47) (Supp. 1990).
89. 526 So. 2d 63, cert denied, 488 U.S. 870 (1988).
90. D.D., 564 So. 2d at 1225.
91. Id.
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alternatives including community control,92 commitment to the Depart-
ment of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), 93 commitment to a
licensed child-caring agency,94 restitution, 5 and juvenile dispositional
alternatives when the child has previously been transferred to the adult
court for trial.96 Each of these dispositional alternatives has been the
subject of regular appellate review over the past three years.97
In addition to the 21 day detention requirement, 8 Florida's law
provides that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services
must move a child from secure detention and place the youngster in a
placement program within five days after the child has been commit-
ted.99 Seven different appellate court opinions over the past year have
dealt with this problem. In C.M. T. v. Department of Health and Reha-
bilitative Services,'00 the appellate court enforced the removal statute
and ruled explicitly that the statute is not discretionary.' 0 ' In a series
of three opinions, M.A. v. Coler,02 D.A.T. v. Coler,13 T.J.D. v.
Coler,0 and A.M.R. v. Coler,10 5 the Second District Court of Appeal
enforced the same five day rule adding that while it was not unsympa-
thetic to the HRS's argument that it was unable to comply with the
statute because of lack of resources, the court was obligated to enforce
the statute. It further suggested that the agency's argument was more
properly addressed to the legislature.10 6 In Interest of A.B., 07 the
Fourth District Court of Appeal was faced with sixteen separate peti-
92. FLA. STAT. § 39.054(1)(a) (Supp. 1990).
93. § 39.054(1)(a)5(c).
94. § 39.054(1)(a)5(b).
95. § 39.054(1)(a)5(f).
96. FLA. STAT. § 39.059 (Supp.1990).
97. See generally Dale, 1988 Survey, supra note 9, at 1163-64; Dale, 1989 Sur-
vey, supra note 12, at 870-83.
98. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
99. FLA. STAT. § 959.12 (1989) (repealed 1990) (the HRS may petition the
court for an additional 10 days to remove a child who has been committed to a place-
ment from the detention center).
100. 550 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
101. Id. at 127 (citing § 959.12).
102. 555 So. 2d 1247 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
103. 552 So. 2d 319 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
104. 555 So. 2d 1245 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
105. 555 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
106. A.M.R., 555 So. 2d at 1249; M.A., 555 So. 2d at 1248; T.J.D., 555 So. 2d
at 1246; D.A.T., 552 So. 2d at 320.
107. 553 So. 2d 1349 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
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tions for mandamus relating to the five day rule. Again, HRS argued
that there were no placement facilities available. Citing other cases, the
appellate court ruled that the statute is mandatory and requires release
of the juvenile held more than five days without placement into a com-
mitment program. 08 This issue appeared to be alleviated with the pas-
sage of the new Juvenile Justice Act and subsequent appropriations. As
noted earlier, as of this writing, the availability of funds for the appro-
priation to HRS to develop placement options which would stop the
backup of youngsters into detention, among other programs, remains
uncertain.
A second dispositional alternative under Florida law is restitu-
tion.1 09 Restitution is defined as money or "in kind" payment. 110 In a
dozen cases this past year the appeals courts have interpreted this
seemingly simple statute. In R.F. v. State,"' the Fourth District ruled
that the trial court must determine that the amount of restitution it
orders is an amount which the child can reasonably be expected to pay.
In this particular case, the court ordered $15,000 in restitution, which
the appellate court said "would inevitably be uncollectible." 112 In D.M.
v. State,' 3 the court ordered restitution of $988.00 in a matter involv-
ing the theft of an automobile. The appellate court reversed because
the trial court left it to the interested parties to develop the payment
schedule. In addition, although the child established that the amount
was beyond his financial ability to pay, he did not establish that it was
beyond the financial ability of his parents." 4 Florida law states that
when restitution is ordered by the court, the amount of restitution shall
not be greater than the amount the child and his parents can reasona-
bly be expected to pay or make." 5 This statute does, however, place a
maximum of $2,500 on parents." 6 In J.O. v. State,1 7 a case which
may have significance for restitution orders, the Third District Court of
Appeals recently reduced a grand theft adjudication to petty theft be-
108. Id. at 1350.
109. FLA. STAT. § 39.054 (Supp. 1990).
110. See FLA. STAT. § 39.11(a)(1) (1989), recodified at § 39.054(1)(a)(1)
(Supp. 1990).
111. 549 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
112. Id. at 1170 (the opinion is silent as to what the restitution was for).
113. 550 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
114. Id. at 150.
115. See FLA. STAT. § 39.054(1)(a)5(f) (Supp. 1990).
116. Id.
117. 552 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
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cause no evidence was presented as to the value of the property stolen.
In G.C. v. State,"" another restitution case, the appellate court ex-
plained the obvious. A child is responsible for that portion of the dam-
age which he caused. In other words, as the Fourth District said In
Interest of J.C.S.,119 if the damage is not the result of the child's con-
duct, even when damage occurs, then restitution is not a proper
disposition.
Two obvious opinions are G.R. v. State,2 ° and L.A.R. v. State. 2'
G.R. involved a theft of $70.00 in American Express Travelers Checks.
The child was unable to cash the check, and the money was refunded
to the customer. Neither American Express nor the customer lost any
money. The court held that in order for restitution to be ordered, there
must be a loss.'22 In L.A.R., the Fifth District Court of Appeals re-
versed because it was not shown that the losses on which the order was
based were caused by the offenses to which the child plead guilty.' 3 .
Florida law does provide an exception to the parents' obligation to
pay restitution if it can be shown that they made "diligent good faith
efforts to prevent the child from engaging in delinquent acts.' 2 4 In
M.D. v. State, 25 the court, in a case of first impression, decided what
constitutes diligence. The court first ruled that the parent had the bur-
den of establishing diligence by the greater weight of the evidence. It
then defined diligence as an effort which is, over and above average, an
effort that is painstaking. 26
Community control, Florida's term for probation, is another dispo-
sitional alternative. The maximum time one may be placed on commu-
nity control is set in various respects by statute. Thus, for example, the
maximum period of community control which may be imposed for
petty theft is 60 days. 27 Therefore, in A.D.A. v. State, 28 the appellate
court ruled that the trial court could not impose community control for
118. 560 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
119. 560 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
120. 564 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 3rd Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
121. 563 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
122. G.R., 564 So. 2d at 208.
123. 563 So. 2d at 837.
124. FLA. STAT. § 39.054(1)(a)(5)(f) (Supp. 1990).
125. 561 So. 2d 1259 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
126. Id. at 1261 (citing WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 386 (1988 ed.)).
127. See FLA. STAT. § 39.054(1)(a)(5)(f) (Supp. 1990)
128. 564 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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a longer period of time than the statute allowed. In M.G. v. State,129
the Fifth District ruled that an imposition of community control may
not exceed the time period to which the child could have been exposed
if the court had ordered a commitment within the juvenile system. The
court distinguished its holding from the adult system, where a distinc-
tion between time in prison and time on community control is allowable
by statute.1 30 Finally, Florida law provides that an order of community
control in a juvenile delinquency case may be revoked under certain
circumstances. In In Interest of L.S.,131 the court held that evidence of
arrest alone is insufficient to cause a violation of community control.
The appellate courts have regularly ruled that a child may not be com-
mitted to HRS or placed on community control for a term longer than
the sentence that could have been imposed if he were an adult.1 32 The
Florida statute is explicit.' 33 Yet, in J.S. v. State,134 the court once
again was obligated to reverse because the trial court ordered a 12-year
old to be committed until his 19th birthday for the burglary of a struc-
ture where, had he been adult, he could be punished for no more than
five years.135
Florida law also provides that at the dispositional stage, when the
court determines it will commit the child to HRS, the agency must
furnish the court with a list of not less than three placement options.
HRS must also rank the order of preference.13 6 The trial courts have
regularly failed to employ the ranked choices and the'appellate courts
have reluctantly ordered them to comply." 7 This year, in State v.
R. W.K.,1 8 the appellate court again dealt with a frustrated trial court
which had ordered HRS to place the child in a specific residential facil-
ity and fully fund the placement. The appellate court held that in the
absence of commitment under the Florida statute, a residential facility
129. 556 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990); see also FLA. STAT. §
39.054(1)(a)(2) (Supp. 1990).
130. Id. See FLA. STAT. § 948.04 (1987).
131. 553 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
132. See Dale, 1989 Survey, supra note 12, at 877 (discussing C.P. v. State, 543
So. 2d 867 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989)).
133. FLA. STAT. § 39.054(4) (Supp. 1990).
134. 552 So. 2d 327 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
135. Id. at 328.
136. FLA. STAT. § 39.052(3)(e)(1) (Supp. 1990).
137. See Dale, 1988 Survey, supra note 9, at 1168; Dale, 1989 Survey, supra
note 12, at 870-73.
138. 556 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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was not a proper placement alternative and, under the Florida statute
the court did not have the statutory authority to place the child in a
specific facility.'
Juvenile court jurisdiction exists until the child's 19th birthday.'4"
Thus, a dispositional order suspending a child's license beyond his 19th
birthday was reversed by the Second District Court of Appeal in
R.M.S. v. State.'41 In addition, in Lewis v. State, the First District
held that community service may not be imposed in lieu of court costs
because the court lacks authority to do so.' 42
Prior to 1988, juveniles could be placed in secure detention on the
basis of contempt adjudications. That year, the Florida. legislature
passed section 39.0321, Florida Statutes, which prohibited the place-
ment of juveniles in secure detention for punishment. 43 rn T.D.L. v.
Chinault,'" the appellate court ruled that placement in secure deten-
tion, based upon contempt, was a clear violation of the new 1988 stat-
ute. In T.D.L., the contemptuous act by the juvenile consisted of wad-
ding up commitment papers and throwing them onto the public
defender's table. The court held the child in criminal contempt and
entered a two-part disposition. It placed the child in secure detention
for 179 days and then converted that detention to a county jail sentence
when the child reached his 18th birthday some twenty days after the
contemptuous act occurred. In addition to vacating the placement of
the juvenile in the juvenile detention center, the appellate court also
139. Id.
140. FLA. STAT. § 39.02(4) (1989), recodified at § 39.022(4) (Supp. 1990).
141. 552 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
142. 564 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
143. Section 39.0321, 1988 Florida Statutes, provided:
Prohibited use of secure detention. - A child alleged to have commit-
ted a delinquent act shall not be placed in secure detention for the follow-
ing reasons:
(1) To punish, treat, or rehabilitate the child.
(2) To allow a parent to avoid his or her responsibility.
(3) To permit more convenient administrative access to the juvenile.
(4) To facilitate further interrogation or investigation.
(5) Due to a lack of more appropriate facilities.
FLA. STAT. § 39.0321 (1989), recodified at FLA. STAT. § 30.043 (Supp. 1990). See
generally Dale, 1988 Survey, supra note 9, at 1190-92 (discussing the contempt powers
prior to 1988 under Florida law in juvenile cases). It would appear that placement in
secure detention for contempt is once again permissible under the 1990 amendments.
See FLA. STAT. § 39.044(10) (Supp. 1990).
144. 570 So. 2d 1335 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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vacated the adult jail sentence. The appellate court concluded that in
order for an adult jail sentence to be properly imposed, the court had to
make specific findings pursuant to section 39.111(7), Florida
Statutes.145
D. Transfer Issues
The juvenile delinquency provisions of the Florida Juvenile Justice
Act provide that under certain circumstances the child may be tried in
adult court. 4 ' When a child has been tried as an adult and convicted,
the court shall determine whether the child should receive adult or ju-
venile sanctions. Six criteria are to be considered. 4 Application of the
criteria continues to produce a significant number of appellate opin-
ions.' 48 The appellate cases have uniformly enforced what the statute
plainly states:
Suitability for adult sanctions is determined by reference to
the six criteria and any decision shall be in writing and in conform-
ity with those criteria with the court maldng a specific finding of
fact and reasons for the decision.149
Yet, the lower courts continue to fail to make written findings as
required.'5 0 As the Third District properly noted in Ervin v. State,'5'
145. Section 39.111(7), Florida Statutes, provides:
(7) When a child has been transferred for criminal prosecution and
the child has been found to have committed a violation of Florida law, the
following procedure shall govern the disposition of the case:
(a) At the disposition hearing the court shall receive and consider a
predisposition report by the department regarding the suitability of the
child for disposition as a child.
FLA. STAT. § 39.111(7) (1989), recodified at FLA. STAT. § 39.059(7)(a) (Supp. 1990).
146. See FLA. STAT. §§ 39.02(4), 39.04(5) (1989), recodified at FLA. STAT. 8
39.059 (Supp. 1990).
147. FLA. STAT. § 39.111(6) (1989), recodified at FLA. STAT. § 39.059(6) (Supp.
1990).
148. See Dale, 1989 Survey, supra note 12, at 880.
149. FLA. STAT. § 39.111(7)(c)(5)(d) (1989).
150. See Lester v. State, 563 So. 2d 178, 179 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990);
Hope v. State, 562 So. 2d 863 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Dinks v. State, 561 So.
2d 1280 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Alan v. State, 560 So. 2d 1329 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1990); State v. McCray, 556 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990);
Levesen v. State, 553 So. 2d 290, 291 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989)(holding that the
failure to order a pre-disposition report pursuant to FLA. STAT. § 39.111(7) (1989),
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not only must there be a written opinion, but that decision must include
specific factual findings to support the conclusion. The failure to make
such findings is reversible error. In Henschke v. State,152 the First Dis-
trict Court of Appeal also explained that the violation of this section
requires that the case be returned to the trial court for resentencing
and that the child is entitled to be present. According to the Fifth Dis-
trict in Youngblood v. State, 53 in making the written decision, the
court must consider all six factors and must not only track them using
conclusory language, but must provide specific underlying findings of
facts and reasons. The court commented on the many prior decisions
holding it reversible error to fail to make the findings under the six
criteria, but also explained that the written findings need not actually
be made at the sentencing, only before reaching the decision. The rec-
ord need only show that the trial court considered the factors at the
time of the sentencing. It would then be required to make a written
explanation.15 "
III. DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS
A. The Right to Counsel
Issues concerning the role of counsel in dependency proceedings
continue to appear in decisions of Florida's appellate courts. 155 In Met-
recodified at FLA. STAT. § 39.059(7) (Supp. 1990), prior to accepting the child's plea
and imposing adult sanctions was reversible error).
151. 561 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
152. 556 So. 2d 409, 410 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
153. 560 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
154. Id.; see also T.D.L. v. Chinault, 570 So. 2d 1335 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1990)(holding that the six criteria are applicable in the context of a contempt proceed-
ing where the court contemplates sanctioning the child by placement in the county
jail); Lang v. State, 566 So. 2d 1354 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that a
check list of the six criteria which is initialed by the court does not satisfy the statutory
requirement of a specific finding of fact and the reason for the decision) (citing Keith v.
State, 542 So. 2d 440, 441 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1989)). The court in Lang also held
that a child could waive rights under the six criteria test, but the waiver must be mani-
fest either in the plea agreement or on the record. See also Dale, 1989 Survey, supra
note 12, at 881-83 (reviewing Keith and other earlier cases articulating the obligations
under the sanctions provision).
155. See Dale, 1988 Survey, supra note 9, at 1171-74; Dale, 1989 Survey, supra
note 12, at 885 (discussing cases decided in prior years together with a basic analysis of
the issue of right to counsel for parties in dependency cases).
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ropolitan Dade County v. Faber,156 the Third District Court of Appeal
certified to the Supreme Court the question of the availability of rea-
sonable attorneys' fees for court appointed lawyers in dependency and
termination proceedings. The issue involved an order by a trial court
that the lawyer for the mother in a dependency and termination case
be paid fees in a reasonable amount in excess of the $1000.00 maxi-
mum, which is provided for in section 39.415, Florida Statutes. The
Second District Court of Appeal had ruled a year earlier in Board of
County Commissioners v. Scruggs,157 that there was a constitutional
right to counsel, and that the fee limitation was an impermissible legis-
lative encroachment on the power of the judiciary. The Scruggs court
ruled that if the facts showed extraordinary circumstances, an award in
excess of the statutory maximum would be allowed. The court in Faber
explicitly agreed with the reasoning in Scruggs. 58
One possible source of representation of parents in dependency
cases is the Office of the Public Defender. However, in Yacucci v. Her-
shey, 59 the Fourth District Court of Appeal ruled that the public de-
fender had no obligation to represent indigent parents in dependency
cases. The case arose because there had been an unwritten policy in the
Office of the Public Defender in Martin County to represent defendants
in both criminal cases and dependency proceedings. When the succes-
sor public defender objected to the practice, and was still appointed,
the defender filed a writ of prohibition and subsequent appeal.6 0 The
court granted the petition and reversed. First, it found that section
27.51, Florida Statutes, which describes the functions of the public de-
fender, is silent as to any authorization to represent parents in depen-
dency proceedings. Similarly, the juvenile code does not allow for such
representation.
Second, the court relied upon an earlier decision in Public 'De-
fender v. Baker'6' which held that neither Chapter 27 nor Chapter 39
of the Florida Statutes gives the court power to appoint the public de-
fender to represent children in dependency proceedings. The court re-
156. 564 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
157. 545 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that a fundamental
constitutional right was involved in such a case, albeit, not a sixth amendment criminal
law right, but a due process right).
158. Faber, 564 So. 2d at 186; see also Dale, 1989 Survey, supra note 12, at
885-86 (providing a more detailed discussion of Scruggs and the underlying issues).
159. 549 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
160. Id. at 783.
161. 371 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
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jected the argument that Rule 3.111 of the Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure provides authority for the court to appoint the public defender. 16 2
The rule states only that lawyers may be provided to indigent individu-
als in all proceedings arising from the initiation of a criminal action
against the defendant which may result in imprisonment. It lists certain
proceedings as examples, although it does not include dependency mat-
ters. The court avoided the rule by saying that it gave no indication
that counsel can be from the public defender's office. This argument is
problematic because the section of the rule refers to counsel as a gen-
eral matter and could just as easily have been interpreted expansively
to include the office of the public defender. The court's third argument
appears to be that counsel need not be appointed because a liberty in-
terest is not a stake. This argument is problematic because indeed the
parent does have a liberty interest in a dependency proceeding. 163 Fi-
nally, the court did not address the fact that under Florida law the
parent does have an absolute right to counsel in a termination of paren-
tal rights proceeding."6
A separate issue, the appropriateness of HRS non-lawyer staff rep-
resenting the Department in uncontested dependency proceedings, has
finally been resolved. The matter had been presented to the Florida
Supreme Court two years ago by the Florida Bar, which sought an
advisory opinion.'6 5 Last year the supreme court ruled that HRS must
162. FLA. RULE CRIM. P. 3.111(c) states:
(c) Duty of Booking Officer. In addition to any other duty, the officer
who commits a defendant to custody has the following duties:
(1) He shall immediately advise the defendant:
(i) of his right to counsel;
(ii) that if the defendant is unable to pay a lawyer, one will be pro-
vided immediately at no charge.
(2) If the defendant requests counsel or advises the officer he cannot
afford counsel, said officer shall immediately and effectively place said de-
fendant in communication with the (office) Public Defender of the circuit
in which the arrest was made.
163. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (explicitly finding a liberty
interest referring specifically to the "interest of a parent and the companionship, care,
custody, and management of his or her children"); Lassiter v. Dep't of Social Services,
452 U.S. 18 (1981) (holding that while due process applied in termination of parental
rights cases, counsel as of right was not an element of the process to which the parent
was entitled. This analysis differs from the statement of the court in Yacucci.).
164. See FLA. STAT. § 39.465(l)(a) (1989).
165. See Florida Bar Re: Advisory Opinion HRS Non-Lawyer Counselor, 518
So. 2d 1270 (Fla. 1988).
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be represented by counsel. 6 The Florida Supreme Court has now
promulgated an amendment to the Florida Rules of Juvenile Proce-
dure, which addresses the unlicensed practice and provides that "the
Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services must be represented
by an attorney at every stage of these proceedings.' 67
B. Evidentiary Issues
Florida Statutes, section 39.409, provides that the court must
briefly state the facts upon which the finding of dependency is made.6 8
An issue about which there appears to be some confusion is whether a
finding of dependency must be reversed when the court fails to recite
the relevant facts supporting the adjudication of dependency pursuant
to the statute, but where the record is sufficient to support the adjudi-
cation. In L T. v. State, 9 the parents appealed from an order adjudi-
cating their son dependent. The Third District Court of Appeal ruled
that the trial court's failure to state the facts upon which its finding of
dependency was made, relying instead on the reasons set forth within
the petition, was clearly reversible error.' 70 However, the appeals court
also evaluated the evidence in the record and found that the state had
failed to show by preponderance of the evidence that the child was de-
pendent and for that reason reversed the order of adjudication. 7'
In Interest of K.S., 72 the parents also appealed from a depen-
dency adjudication. They argued the court's order omitted a recitation
of the specific facts upon which the determination was based and the
record was insufficient to support a finding of dependency. The appel-
late court held that when a court fails to make the appropriate recita-
tion of facts supporting the adjudication, and a sufficient factual basis
cannot be discerned, reversal may be required.' 7 ' However, in K.S., the
First District Court of Appeals found the necessary evidence in the rec-
166. In Re Advisory of Opinion HRS Non-Lawyer Counselor, 547 So. 2d 909
(Fla. 1989).
167. 557 So. 2d 1360 (Fla. 1990) (amending FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.610(a)).
168. FLA. STAT. § 39.409(3) (1989).
169. 532 So. 2d 1085 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
170. Id. at 1088.
171. Id. at 1090.
172. 558 So. 2d 158 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
173. Id. at 158 (citing Interest of C.S., 503 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1987)).
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ord and thus affirmed. 174
Similarly, in T.S. v. State,175 parents appealed an order of depen-
dency on the grounds that the evidence was insufficient and that the
court failed to state the factual basis. The Second District Court of
Appeal found that an examination of the record of the proceedings dis-
closed sufficient evidence to support the finding of dependency.'1 6 How-
ever, the court also held that the specific factual basis stated by the
court-the children were found to be living in the conditions set forth
in the dependency petition-was insufficient to support an adjudication
of dependency under the mandate of section 39.409 of the Florida Stat-
utes. 177 Because, under the facts of this case, the trial court could have
withheld an adjudication of dependency, the appellate court remanded
and ruled that the adjudication be stricken.18 Thus, it is unclear from
T.S. what the court would have done if it had been faced with a situa-
tion where the record had proven the dependency, the findings had not
been made under section 39.409, and further intervention had appeared
necessary.
The court's reliance in T.S. on three earlier intermediate appellate
opinions in support of its conclusion that the court order failed to state
the facts upon which the finding was made as required by section
39.409(3) of the Florida Statutes, does not clarify matters. The three
cases are LT, 79 Fitzpatrick v. State,80 and Interest of C.S..'8' In two
of the cases, LT. and C.S., the courts ruled that failure to make the
order specifying the facts upon which the dependency was based was
clearly reversible error. 182 In Fitzpatrick, on the other hand, the appel-
late court held that the trial court erred by simply resolving the petition
without making the necessary factual findings, but it never concluded
that this alone was reversible error.' 83 All three courts also evaluated
the evidentiary record. In LT. and C.S., the appellate courts deter-
mined the state had failed to prove dependency.' In Fitzpatrick, the
174. Id. at 159.
175. 557 So. 2d 676 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
176. Id. at 677.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. 532 So. 2d 1085.
180. 515 So. 2d 319 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
181. 503 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
182. I.T., 532 So. 2d at 1088; C.S., 503 So. 2d at 418.
183. 515 So. 2d at 320-21.
184. LT., 532 So. 2d at 1088; C.S., 503 So. 2d at 418.
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court remanded with directions to make appropriate factual findings
because the evidence before the appellate court was in conflict.18 5 Fi-
nally, in Fitzpatrick, the court also noted that the reason for reviewing
a facially insufficient dependency order is to provide an early resolution
of the child's placement. 186
What these cases teach is that Florida courts will look beyond the
statutory authority to determine whether, despite the failure to make
factual findings, there was evidence in the record to substantiate the
determination of dependency. While they may be practical resolutions,
the decisions seem contrary to the clear statutory language of section
30.409, Florida Statutes. It does not seem at all difficult for the appel-
late courts to do with section 39.409 what they have done in the delin-
quency area with section 39.111, Florida Statutes. In other words, if
the factual findings are not stated on the record, the court simply re-
mands the case to the trial court for a recitation of the factual bases
for the decision. Proper findings will provide the parties and the appel-
late court a clear record against which to argue the legal significance of
the underlying facts.18 7
185. Fitzpatrick, 515 So. 2d at 321.
186. Id..
187. What is interesting about the development of the seeming exception to sec-
tion 39.409, Florida Statutes, based upon a review of the facts, is the process of reli-
ance on prior cases until one reaches the seminal case. See generally A.T. v. State, 409
So. 2d 155 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (its assertion is unsupported by statute or
doctrine). A.T. is a termination of parental rights case involving the failure of the trial
court to comply Rule 8.810 of the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure which required
that a final order granting a petition for permanent commitment include a statement of
the facts upon which the court based its order. Despite the failure to comply with the
rule, the court upheld the determination based upon "overwhelming evidence support-
ing the permanent commitment, as well as the need for an early resolution of this case
in order to provide a stable, emotional environment for the children." Id. at 156.
The problem with this conclusion is that there is no support for it in either the rule
or the statute. One might argue that where there is a failure to comply with the factual
findings, affirmance may be justified on grounds of harmless error. But none of the
cases uses this argument. Even so, the problem with the harmless error argument is
that significant rights are in issue. See e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
Furthermore, the statute is otherwise meaningless. It was clearly written for a purpose
and that purpose was to obligate the court to set out the factual basis for its opinion.
To do otherwise is to force the appellate court on a cold record to carry out what is in
effect a de novo review of the underlying facts. The trial court is in a much better
position to evaluate credibility and demeanor of witnesses. It may well be that the
appellate court upholds a finding of dependency in a case based upon facts which the
trial court, had it entered an order listing the factual basis for the opinion, would have
Dale 1193
25
Dale: Juvenile Law: 1990 Survey of Florida Law
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Nova Law Review
The matter of proof in dependency cases is constantly litigated on
the appellate level."' 8 In C.C. v. HRS,189 the First District Court of
Appeal was faced with a question of whether the facts of the underly-
ing dependency amounted to a significant impairment of the child's
physical, mental or emotional health as is required under the statutory
definition of abuse.190 In this case, the court held that the mother's act
of loudly and angrily scolding a child, shaking the youngster by the
shoulders and striking the child's face and legs at the courthouse
amounted to an isolated event. There simply was no further evidence to
support the finding, although the court noted that uncontrolled and
hysterical behavior is to be condemned. Based upon a preponderance of
the evidence, the court could find no evidence of repeated activities and
so reversed and remanded the finding.' 9'
The difficulty of proving child abuse is demonstrated in In Inter-
est of N. W.,'1 2 where, despite evidence of severe physical abuse of the
child, the state could not prove who was the perpetrator. The court of
appeal reversed the finding that the father was the perpetrator. There
was testimony that both parents had access to the child and that the
child became rigid and exhibited hysterical behavior at the appearance
of the father. However, all staffing participants believed that identifica-
tion of the perpetrator was impossible, and the child had been cared for
by various family members at the relevant point in time.-"" The trial
court had also relied upon the father's personality type and potential
for cruel behavior as well as his institution of a paternity action prior to
the alleged abuse. According to the appellate court, such evidence
amounted to "little more then innuendo and speculation concerning the
father's surmised superior ability to abuse in the tragic manner to
which he was abused.' 94
In Paquin v. HRS,19 5 the court was faced with the question of
whether a finding of dependency as to one child can be used as the
rejected. Finally, it does not seem burdensome to require on remand that the trial court
simply state the facts for its decision.
188. See Dale, 1989 Survey, supra note 12, at 890-92.
189. 556 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
190. See FLA. STAT. § 39.01(2) (Supp. 1990).
191. 556 So. 2d at 417; see also Interest of T.S., 511 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1987); In re W.P., 434 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
192. 564 So. 2d 257 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
193. Id. at 258.
194. Id.
195. 561 So. 2d 1286 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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basis for a finding as to second child. In the Paquin case, the court
found three children dependent. The facts demonstrated that the father
sexually abused one son and that the abuse occurred in 'the presence of
a second son. The court ruled that there was no competent evidence
that the third youngster, who did not live in the same household with
the two brothers, had witnessed any abuse or might be subjected to
abuse in the future. On that basis, the court ruled that there could be
no transfer of dependency. Thus, as to the single child the finding of
dependency was reversed. 96
C. Procedural Matters
The question of whether a child may see his file at the end of a
dependency case was before the Fourth District Court of Appeal in
C.E.B. v. Birken.1 7 Reported in local newspapers, this case involved
pro se actions by a youngster to obtain the contents of his court file.
The circuit court judge had refused to unseal the social section of the
youngster's file and to turn the informatidn over to him."9 8 The district
court of appeal reversed the lower court and held that under Florida
law the petitioner had the right to review the official records. Origi-
nally, the court reasoned that under section 39.411(3), Florida Stat-
utes, the child is one person who has the right to inspect and copy the
official record.199 HRS had argued that providing the material was dis-
cretionary based upon the court's determination of the child's best in-
terests. The court rejected this argument on the ground that the use of
196. Id. at 1287.
197. 566 So. 2d 907 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
198. Id. at 908.
199. FLA. STAT. § 39.411(3) (Supp. 1990) provides:
(3) The clerk shall keep all court records required by this part sepa-
rate from other records of the circuit court. All court records required by
this part shall not be open to inspection by the public. All records shall be
inspected only upon order of the court by persons deemed by the court to
have a proper interest therein, except that, subject to the provisions of s.
63.162, a child and the parents or legal custodians of the child and their
attorneys, law enforcement agencies, and the department and its designees
shall always have the right to inspect and copy any official record pertain-
ing to the child. The court may permit authorized representatives of recog-
nized organizations compiling statistics for proper purposes to inspect and
make abstracts from official records, under whatever conditions upon their
use and disposition the court may deem proper, and punish by contempt
proceedings any violation of those conditions.
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the word "shall" made this statutory provision mandatory.200 The court
then decided what constitutes the total record given that there is a "so-
cial section" of the juvenile file. It found that the official record must
be turned over.201 The court found that whether HRS and other agency
reports constitute part of the official record is based upon whether the
court relied upon them or considered them in reaching its determina-
tion. If it did, the documents from the social file are part of the official
record.202
A difficult question of discovery was raised in In Interest of
C.W.203 In that case, the trial court granted a motion filed by the father
requiring a 4-year old child, alleged to be the victim of sexual abuse, to
undergo a physical and psychological examination.20 4 On appeal, the
court quashed the trial court's order on the basis that there was no
compelling reason advanced by the father to support the intrusion. The
court relied upon State v. Drab,2 °5 which held that in the context of a
criminal charge of sexual battery on a child, the defendant must show
the presence of extreme and compelling circumstances such that the
denial of the examination will deprive the defendant of due process. 20 6
Dependency proceedings continue to be entwined with custody
matters." In Ammons v. Hathaway,2" 8 the trial court ruled on a peti-
200. 566 So. 2d at 909. The court in dicta determined that if the child was ma-
ture enough to persuade the court on the law, he was old enough to "handle" the
disclosure of his own juveniles records on remand. Id.
201. Official records are defined at section 39.411(2), Florida Statutes:
(2) The court shall make and keep records of all cases brought before
it pursuant to this chapter and shall preserve the records pertaining to a
dependent child until 10 years after the last entry was made, or until the
child is 18 years of age, whichever date is first reached, and may then
destroy them, except that records of cases where orders were entered per-
manently depriving a parent of the custody of a juvenile shall be preserved
permanently. This court shall make official records, consisting of all peti-
tions and orders filed in a case arising pursuant to this part and any other
pleadings, certificates, proofs of publication, summonses, warrants, and
other writs which may be filed therein.
FLA. STAT. § 39.411(2) (Supp. 1990).
202. C.E.B., 556 So. 2d at 910.
203. 553 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
204. Id. at 293.
205. 546 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
206. Id. at 55-56. Rule 8.750 of the Florida Rules of Juvenile Prccedure provides
for examinations of children, guardians and other persons when custody is in issue. The
discovery rule, 8.770, is silent on the issue of physical examinations.
207. See Dale, 1989 Survey, supra note 12, at 891 (discussing In Re F.B., 534
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tion for permanent custody filed by a mother. The children, who had
previously been declared dependent, were placed in the custody of their
paternal aunt and uncle where they remained after the mother filed her
petition. She alleged that she was now able to provide sufficient finan-
cial and emotional support to the youngsters. 0 9 After a hearing, the
trial court entered an order providing that the children be permanently
placed with the aunt and uncle. The order also gave the mother visita-
tion rights based upon the best interests of the child.210 The appellate
court ruled that the permanent status of dependency is not an option
available under Chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes.211 The court ex-
plained that its primary obligation is to return the children to their
natural parents, and only when such efforts are exhausted is permanent
placement, with the aim of adoption, appropriate. The court noted that
custody in the natural parents "is an important interest which should
generally not be terminated absent certain circumstances constituting
abandonment or an unfitness which impacts the child's welfare." '212
The First District seems to have understood clearly the distinction
between the test for dependency and custody. The best interests of the
child is not the test in a dependency case, but may be proper when the
issue is one of custody. Clearly Chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes does
not allow a dependency matter to be turned into a custody case.213 In
Ammons, the court also quite properly pointed out that the court
should not rely principally on material and economic benefits as op-
posed to personal, emotional and social welfare and stability as the ba-
sis for a custody determination.2 14
The rather technical matter of who can commence a dependency
proceeding was raised in the Fourth District Court of Appeal in In
So. 2d 899 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1988)); Dale, 1988 Survey, supra note 9, at 1182
(discussing In re A.W., 519 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1988)).
208. 550 So. 2d 145 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
209. Id. at 146.
210. Id.
211. Id. (citing Interest of K.H., 444 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984)).
212. Id.
213. See also Matter of Sanjivini K., 47 N.Y.2d 374, 391 N.E.2d 1316, 418
N.Y.S.2d 339 (1979); Bennett v. Jeffries, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 356 N.E.2d 277, 387 N.Y.2d
821 (1978) (discussing the difference between the test for custody and dependency).
214. 550 So. 2d at 146; see also In re J.H., 535 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1988)(setting out the same proposition in the context of a dependency
proceeding).
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Interest of J.M..215 In this case, maternal grandparents appealed the
trial court's dismissal of their petition for dependency on the motion of
HRS, who desired dismissal. The court of appeals held that section
39.404(1), Florida Statutes, provides that any person with knowledge
of the facts may file the petition for dependency.216 HRS is not the only
agency or party who can commence a proceeding.2 17 Thus, the appel-
late court reversed.
A technical issue of appellate practice in dependency cases came
before the Fifth District Court of Appeal this past year. In HRS v.
C.G.,21 8 HRS sought to challenge by certiorari a court order adjudicat-
ing a child dependent and ordering the youngster to be placed in the
first available opening at a particular facility.21 9 The appellate court
held that the appropriate remedy was not certiorari but plenary appeal.
Although the Florida Supreme Court had previously held that under
certain circumstances the appellate court has jurisdiction to review a
case even when the form of appellate relief is misstated, the difficulty
in the particular case was that the 30-day time frame within which to
file a notice of appeal had expired. 2 0 The Fifth District Court of Ap-
peal refused to follow the holding of the Fourth District, which de-
clined jurisdiction over an appeal where the party incorrectly sought
relief by certiorari. 21 Rather, the Fifth District agreed with the dis-
sent, which viewed the timely filing of the application for certiorari as
sufficient to invoke appellate court jurisdiction.222
Florida, like many other states, has recently developed a state-
wide child abuse reporting system. It includes an abuse registry which
receives reports and pursuant to which HRS conducts investigations.
2 3
When a report is received and HRS conducts an investigation, the in-
215. 560 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
216. FLA. STAT. § 39.404(1) (Supp. 1990).
217. 560 So. 2d at 343 (citing Interest of J.R.T., 427 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1983)).
218. 556 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
219. The issue on the merits appears to be governed by Interest of K.A.B., 483
So. 2d 898 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1986) and FLA. STAT. § 39.41(5) (Supp. 1990),
which conclude that HRS determines when and with whom a dependent child shall
live. C.G., 556 So. 2d at 1244.
220. Id. at 1244; see Johnson v. Citizen State Bank, 537 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1989).
221. See Skinner v. Skinner, 541 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989),
vacated, 561 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1990).
222. 556 So. 2d at 1244; Skinner, 541 So. 2d at 176.
223. See generally FLA. STAT. §§ 415.501-.513 (1989).
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vestigator must determine whether abuse or neglect has occurred and
identify the perpetrator. 2 4 When the report stems from corporal pun-
ishment as occurred in B.R. v. HRS,226 the question is one of whether
the punishment was "excessive." HRS had an internal policy to con-
firm reports of excessive corporal punishment in those cases where the
bruises remained visible for least 24 hours.2" 6 In B.R., two school offi-
cials had paddled a student. The next day the student's mother re-
ported the incident to HRS which confirmed abuse under the 24-hour
rule.2 27 The court ruled on the definition of the term despite the fact
that HRS subsequently withdrew the 24-hour rule and conceded re-
versible error.22 8 The court held that "whether corporal punishment is
excessive must be proved in each case by competent, substantial evi-
dence, and all relevant issues presented must be considered without re-
sort to arbitrary presumptions fixed by the passage of time.2129
IV. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
In 1981, the United States Supreme Court held that the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment did not give natural parents
an absolute right to counsel in every termination of parental rights
case, although the court did suggest that generally a lawyer ought to be
provided.230 By statute, Florida authorizes the appointment of counsel
for parents in all termination of parental rights cases and further pro-
vides that the court shall appoint counsel for insolvent persons.231 In In
224. See FLA. STAT. § 415.503(5) (Supp. 1990).
225. 558 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
226. Id. at 1028.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 1029. The court also noted that corporal punishment is authorized in
the public school system. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. §§ 231.085, 232.227 (1989)). See In-
graham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (discussing the constitutionality of corporal
punishment in schools); see also Dale, Children Before the Supreme-Court: In Whose
Best Interests?, 53 ALB. L. REv. 513, 552-557 (1989) (analyzing Ingraham); Rosen-
berg, A Study in Irrationality: Refusal to Grant Substantive Due Process Protection
Against Excessive Corporal Punishment in the Public Schools, 27 Hous. L. REv. 399
(1990) (analyzing constitutional claims for damages based upon corporal punishment
in schools).
230. Lassiter v. Dep't of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
231. FLA. STAT. § 39.465(1)(a) (1989); see also Dale, 1989 Survey, supra note
12, at 899.
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Interest of M.R.,2 2 the court vacated an order terminating parental
rights on the ground that the record failed to reveal that the insolvent
parents were afforded meaningful assistance of counsel. In M.R., the
trial court appointed counsel pursuant to the statute, but the appellate
court found that the lawyer failed to appear at the adjudicatory hear-
ing and acted in other ways which raised doubts about his competence.
The court recognized the severity of this loss, stating that the right of
impoverished parents to a lawyer is a basic right guaranteed by the due
process clause of both the United States and Florida Constitutions.233
The opinion is imprecise in its interpretation of the federal constitu-
tional guarantee in light of the holding in Lassiter v. Department of
Social Services, in which the Supreme Court said that due process does
not require a court to appoint counsel for an indigent parent in all ter-
mination proceedings.23 4 However, while there is no constitutional right
to counsel per se, the First District is correct in its ruling that once
counsel is provided - and in Florida by statute it must be - the parents'
right to be protected is lost when there is no meaningful assistance. The
court did not articulate the exact contours of the principle of meaning-
ful assistance.23 5 However, the United States Supreme Court did say
232. 565 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
233. Id. at 372.
234. 452 U.S. at 26-27. The Court concluded that:
In some, the court's precedent speak with one voice about what 'fun-
damental fairness' has meant when the Court has considered the right to
appointed counsel, and we thus draw from them the presumption that an
indigent litigant has a right to appointed counsel only when, if he loses, he
may be deprived of his physical liberty.
Id. There being no deprivation of liberty to the parent, the Court held that there was
no absolute right to counsel. However, perhaps in an effort to ameliorate the impact of
its decision, the Court went on to say:
In its Fourteenth Amendment, our Constitution imposes on the State
the standards necessary to ensure the judicial proceedings are fundamen-
tally fair. A wise public policy, however, may require that higher stan-
dards be opted than those minimally tolerable under the Constitution. In-
formed opinion has clearly come to hold that an indigent parent is entitled
to the assistance of appointed counsel not only in parental termination pro-
ceedings, but in dependency and neglect proceedings as well . . . The
Court's opinion today in no way implies that the standards increasing the
urge by informed public opinion and now widely followed by the states are
other than enlightened and wise.
Id. at 34-35.
235. 565 So. 2d at 372; see Richardson & Smith, States Differ Over Compensa-
tion for Lawyers for Indigent Parents, Nat'l L. J., Oct. 22, 1990, at 16 (survey of the
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that counsel has to be present at critical stages of the proceedings and
that performance might otherwise fail to afford the most basic services
to be reasonably expected by competent counsel.23 6
Because Florida participates in the Federal Child Abuse Preven-
tion Act of 1974, it appoints guardians ad litem in dependency pro-
ceedings.237 In In Interest of C.B.,238 a court appointed guardian ad
litem appealed from an order dismissing her petition for termination of
parental rights. The trial court had ruled that the termination statute
was unconstitutional because it permitted any person who had knowl-
edge of the facts justifying the termination to file the petition.23 9 The
section in question states that "any other person who has knowledge of
the facts alleged or is informed of them and believes they are true,' 240
may file a petition. The court held that neither the privacy rights of the
parent nor the suggested limitation that only HRS or licensed child
care agencies could initiate the proceedings, was a valid basis for find-
ing the statute unconstitutional. 2 1 However, the court, without cita-
tion, then defined the phrase "any other person who has knowledge" as
"someone who is in peculiar position so that such knowledge can rea-
sonably be inferred; for example, the judge familiar with the file, the
guardian or attorney for the child, neighbors or friends of the parties
who, because of their proximity could be expected to have knowledge,
etc. ' 242 Perhaps the concern of the appellate court was that the action
might be commenced by someone with improper motives. However, this
dicta does not appear to be based on authority in the appellate courts
or the language of the statute. The matter should properly be handled
by the legislature.
Florida, like other states, has passed legislation aimed at guaran-
teeing either speedy return of the child to his or her parents or termina-
issue of compensation for lawyers for indigent parents, in which, significantly, the au-
thors misconstrue the Florida statute and case law on the right to counsel).
236. 452 U.S. at 372.
237. 42 U.S.C. § 5101 et seq. (1989); FLA. STAT. § 415.508 (1989); FLA. R. Juv.
P. 8.590(c); see also Dale, 1989 Survey, supra note 12, at 888.
238. 5671 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
239. Id.
240. FLA. STAT. § 39.461(1) (1989). Interestingly, HRS challenged the constitu-
tionality of the statute. The appellate court then raised the issue of whether HRS had
standing to do so. C.B., 561 So. 2d at 665.
241. Id. at 666.
242. Id.
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tion of parental rights.24 3 In compliance with federal legislation,244 af-
ter a finding of dependency, HRS will either provide the parent with a
performance agreement or a permanent placement plan, dependent on
whether the agency concludes that the child should go home or be
placed out ultimately for adoption.245 However, under certain circum-
stances HRS may move to terminate parental rights without requiring
a performance agreement or permanent placement plan.
In In Interest of D.J.,248 the mother of four minor children ap-
pealed from the final order terminating her parental rights, arguing
that the circumstances did not require this extraordinary procedure. 41
The court held that there was no requirement that HRS participate in
a performance agreement or permanent placement plan if evidence is
presented showing either abandonment or severe or continuous
abuse. 48 The court found that the extraordinary procedures -provision
applied because there was clear evidence of severe abuse of two of the
mother's children. 249 Significantly, the court terminated parental rights
to each of the children, although the opinion only described physical
injury to two of the youngsters. Although the court did not speak to the
issue of transferred neglect,250 it held that two physical manifestations
of abuse had the effect of threatening the life and well being of each of
the children.2 51
In Interest of J.A.,252 the court was faced with the difficult ques-
tion of whether it could terminate parental rights where the patients'
inability to comply with the performance agreement was caused by
chronic mental illness. The trial court had concluded that it was in the
best interests of the child to terminate parental rights bat ruled that
243. See generally FLA. STAT. § 39.451 (1989).
244. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272,
94 Stat. 500 (1980).
245. See generally Dale, 1988 Survey, supra note 9, at 1186-87.
246. 553 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
247. Id. at 379.
248. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 39.464(2) (Supp. 1990).
249. 553 So. 2d at 379. The childrens' injuries included a fractured skull as a
result of one youngster's head being struck against a door and the other suffering vigor-
ous shaking.
250. See FLA. STAT. § 39.464(2)(b)(2) (Supp. 1990) (providing a finding of
transferred neglect).
251. D.J., 553 So. 2d at 379; see infra notes 271-274 and accompanying text
(analyzing transferred neglect).
252. 561 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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section 39.467(2)(c), Florida Statutes, prevented the termination.2 53
The facts of the case indicated that the mother suffered from chronic
mental illness, and it was quite unlikely that she would ever be able to
safely raise her son.254 The appellate court concluded that the legisla-
ture did not intend to preclude termination of parental rights when
chronic mental illness of the parent prevents return of the child. The
court relied upon the legislative enactment, which refers to the location
of a permanent stable placement for children resulting either in the
return home or adoption. The appellate court also concluded that a
condition which is beyond the parent's control cannot be used to cate-
gorically preclude the termination of parental rights and placement for
adoption; to do so would be to frustrate the statute.255 The court ex-
plained that there might be circumstances beyond the parent's control
which are of a temporary nature. In situations unlike J.A. where
prompt safe return of the child to the parent is a realistic possibility,
the protection makes sense.256
The issue of prospective neglect continues to appear in the appel-
late case law, although the legislature amended Chapter 39 of the Flor-
ida Statutes in an effort to define the concept. 57 In Caso v. HRS,258
the appellate court affirmed a judgment terminating parental rights of
a mother with long standing and significant psychiatric problems.259
Relying upon earlier case law upholding termination of parental rights
253. Id. at 357. FLA. STAT. § 39.467(2)(c) (Supp. 1990) states:
(2) For the purpose of determining the manifest best interests of the
child, the court shall consider and evaluate all relevant factors, including,
but not limited to:
(c) The present mental and physical health needs of the child and the
future needs of the child to the extent that such future needs can be ascer-
tained based on the present condition of the child.
254. J.A., 561 So. 2d at 357.
255. Id. at 359-60.
256. Id. (relying upon the decision in Interest of T.D., 537 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that parental rights should not ordinarily be terminated
on the basis of a temporary deficiency beyond the parent's control)); see also Interest
of R.D.D. Jr., 518 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
257. See Dale, 1989 Survey, supra note 12, at 895-99 (discussing earlier cases).
FLA. STAT. § 39.01(10)(e) (1989) defines a dependant child "to be at substantial risk of
imminent abuse or neglect by the parent or parents or custodian." See also Matter of
Charmine W., 61 A.D.2d 769, 402 N.Y.S.2d 19 (1st Dept. 1978); Matter of Valeric
Leonic T., 107 A.D.2d 327, 487 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1st Dept. 1985) (applying the doctrine
in another jurisdiction).
258. 569 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
259. Id. at 471.
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based upon the concept of prospective neglect,2 60 the court applied both
past factual information and its own projection about what would occur
in the future to uphold the termination. Specifically, the appellate court
found that the mother had failed to get medical care for her son, failed
to provide medication, failed to adequately supervise him, failed to
comply with a performance agreement, and failed to complete counsel-
ing. Additionally, the court found that the mother's psychiatric history
and past behavior would create a potentially significant impairment of
the child's mental and physical condition.261 The court concluded that
the mother had deprived the child of a physically and emotionally safe
environment in the past and that such deprivation would appear certain
to occur in the future.262
Chief Judge Schwartz dissented and, while bluntly recognizing
there were serious shortcomings in the mother,6 3 concluded that there
was no demonstration that the mother had forfeited parental interest as
defined under the Florida termination of parental rights statute. Chief
Judge Schwartz applied the same standards set out in a series of dis-
senting opinions written over the past several years by Judge Coward of
the Fifth District Court of Appeal.264
In In Interest of D.J.S.,26 decided this past year in the First Dis-
trict, can itself serve as an outline of the many issues confronting the
courts in matters of termination of parental rights. It is an en banc
reversal of a decision which had reversed a trial court order terminat-
260. See Palmer v. HRS, 547 So. 2d 981, 983 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. (1989),
caused dismissed, 553 So. 2d 1166 (Fla. 1989); I.T. v. State, 532 So 2d 1085, 1088
(Fla. 3rd Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Interest of R.D.D., 518 So. 2d at 412; Interest of
J.J.C., 498 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Interest of J.B.H., 491 So. 2d
1226 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Interest of J.L.P., 416 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1982).
261. Caso, 569 So. 2d at 468.
262. Id. at 471.
263. According to the Chief Judge, "the court's opinion conclusively demon-
strates in agonizing detail that [the child] would have been far better off with the
mother different from the early-flawed and seriously ill woman who gave him birth."
Id.
264. See Letts v. HRS, 547 So. 2d 328, 330 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1989);
Manuel v. HRS, 537 So. 2d 1022, 1024 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Gunter v.
HRS, 531 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Fredrick v. HRS, 523 So. 2d
1164, 1167 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 531 So. 2d 1353 (Fla. 1988); see
also Dale, 1989 Survey, supra note 12, at 895-99 (discussing the issue of prospective
neglect).
265. 563 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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ing parental rights. The major issues concern the standard of review for
the termination of parental rights, the tests for child abuse and child
neglect, whether abuse and neglect can be applied prospectively, when
a finding of dependency may be transferred from one child to the other,
and what constitutes compliance with performance agreements under
Florida law.2"6
Before analyzing the majority and minority views on these issues,
it is necessary to discuss two procedural matters which appear in the
opinion. First, the dissents argue that en banc rehearing was predicated
in part on the ground that this was a case of exceptional importance
involving the application of the United States Supreme Court holding
in Lehr v. Robinson2 67 and the Florida Supreme Court opinion in Doe
v. Roe.268 In Lehr, the Supreme Court held that a putative father who
had not developed a substantial relationship with his child had no con-
stitutional right to challenge his child's adoption.26 9 The Florida Su-
preme Court ruled similarly in Doe. Careful reading of both the major-
ity and minority opinions in D.J.S. demonstrates that the issue decided
in Lehr and Doe was not dealt with in the en banc redetermination.
There is no explanation as to why this was the case.
The second procedural issue related to the content of the record on
appeal. The dissent argued that a number of documents, which it
viewed to be crucial, were missing from the recoid.2 70 Apparently miss-
ing were the performance agreements with which the department
claimed the father failed to comply, prior proceedings, motions, orders
and reports which the trial court judicially noticed, as well as the order
of adjudication of dependency of July, 1986, reports from the guardian
ad litem, and other reports. The majority concluded that these docu-
ments were not crucial to its determination. 1
D.J.S. involved the termination of parental rights of two children
of a man who was the putative father of one child (J.S.G.) and who,
while not the natural father of the second youngster (D.J.S.), raised
that child for some period of time while living with the child's mother.
266. Id. at 661-69.
267. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
268. 543 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 1989).
269. 463 U.S. at 267; see Dale, The Evolving Constitutional Rights of Non-
Marital Children: Mixed Blessings, 5 GA. ST. L. REV. 523 (1989) (discussing in detail
Lehr v. Robinson and the body of Supreme Court case law relating to the rights of
putative fathers to contest termination of parental rights and adoptions).
270. D.J.S., 563 So. 2d at 684.
271. Id. at 668 n.16.
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When D.J.S. was 18 months of age, the appellant struck the child caus-
ing physical injury. He was subsequently charged with aggravated
child abuse and pleaded nolo contendere . 72 Approximately 16 months
after the incident, D.J.S.'s mother gave birth to J.S.G. Appellant and
the mother voluntarily placed the child with HRS. Thus, J.S.G. was
never in appellant's custody and D.J.S. was in his custody for a short
period of time prior to the beating. 73 Based upon a variety of asser-
tions, including physical assaults, alcohol and drug abuse, incarcera-
tion, and failure to comply with performance agreements, HRS eventu-
ally sought to terminate parental rights. After a hearing with 16
witnesses over a four day period, the trial court terminated parental
rights.2 74 On rehearing en banc, the majority held that the standard of
review of a termination proceeding, is that "a trial court's determina-
tion that evidence is clear and convincing will not be overturned unless
it may be said as a matter of law that no one would reasonably find
such evidence to be clear and convincing. "275 The appellate court noted
that it is not a matter of de novo review but rather, whether the deci-
sion is clearly erroneous or lacking in evidentiary support. 276
On the matter of child abuse, the issue was whether the proven
criminal offense against D.J.S. could be used to support evidence of
child abuse and subsequently a termination of parental rights as to
J.S.G. The majority opinion, relying upon a series of majority opinions
in other cases, concluded that it could. 7 The court further held that
the evidence of abuse as to one child could be used together with other
evidence to predict abuse against the other child, in other words em-
ploying the tests of transferred intent and prospective neglect. 278 The
majority held that the battery of the child was not an isolated act and
that the law did not require the child to continue to be at risk. As the
majority. rhetorically put it, "'how much more should this child be
forced to endure?'... That question and response, 'no more,' fits here
272. Id. at 658.
273. Id. at 657-58.
274. Id. at 659.
275. D.J.S., 563 So. 2d at 661-62 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.41(l)(f)3 (1989)).
276. Id. at 662 (citing The Florida Bar v. Hooper, 509 So. 2d 289, 290-91 (Fla.
1987)).
277. Id. at 663 (citing Interest of W.D.N., 443 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1984)).
278. Id. (citing the various cases discussed earlier in this survey article); see
supra note 260.
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as well. 2 7 19 On the issue of child neglect, the court held that despite the
fact that the father never had legal or actual custody of the child he
fathered, he could nonetheless be held accountable for neglect because
a duty is imposed upon him regardless of the child's circumstances.
The appellate court recognized that the appellant had made some ef-
forts on behalf of the children, but concluded that the trial court was in
the best position to determine whether the concern.was genuine. 280
The court next ruled on the performance agreement. It held first,
as have other courts, that failure to comply with the performance
agreement cannot be the sole basis for a ruling terminating parental
rights.2"' However, it recognized that failure to comply can be consid-
ered as one of a number of factors. Taken together with other evidence,
it found that the lack of compliance was an element to be considered in
terminating parental rights. The majority found that under Florida law
when there is no prospect that the parent can ever assume parental
responsibilities, it is appropriate to terminate parental rights.282
The dissent disagreed vigorously about the facts in a detailed opin-
ion.283 Its stated purpose was to demonstrate that the evidence was le-
gally insufficient. Therefore, in its view there was no question of excep-
tional importance to allow an en banc review. 8s On the issue of abuse,
the dissent argued that the single episode of child abuse involving the
child D.J.S. and persistent aggressive and violent action toward the
mother, were not sufficient to prove that the father had abused J.S.G.
and that he was likely to abuse him in the future. 8 5 According to the
dissent, the facts of this case did not match those of other cases where
abuse of one child could be transferred to another. 286 On the issue of
neglect, the dissent again disagreed with the majorify over the facts. 87
The dissent argued that the father did what he should have under the
circumstances to protect his children by contacting HRS.2 s The dis-
279. Id. at 664 (citing J.M. v. HRS, 479 So. 2d 826, 828 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1985)).
280. D.J.S., 563 So. 2d at 667.
281. Id. at 668 (citing Interest of P.A.D., 498 So. 2d 1342 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1986)).
282. Id. at 669-70 (citing FLA. STAT. § 409.168(1)(a) (Supp. 1986).
283. Id. at 672-81 (Zehmer, J., dissenting).
284. Id. at 686.
285. D.J.S., 563 So. 2d at 687.
286. Id. at 688.
287. Id.
288. Id.
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sent agreed that the father's failure to comply with the performance
agreement cannot be the sole ground to terminate parental rights.18 9 It
concluded that because the performance agreements were not before it,
it was impossible to rule on this issue.290 Further, it concluded that the
performance agreements were invalid because neither contemplated re-
turn of the child to the father's custody as, according to the dissent,
Florida law requires.29x
At the heart of the dissent, and apparently independent of its view
of the facts and impact of the decision on the individual parties, is its
belief that the majority opinion sets bad legal precedent. "The ex-
traordinary length of this dissent alone serves to convey my deep con-
cern that the en banc decision will be allowed to stand as bad legal
precedent for seriously relaxing, if not judicially overriding, important
statutory requirements governing the termination of parental rights."2 9
It is not as clear that the majority misinterpreted the law as it is
that it applied the law differently to the facts than did the dissent.
However, it does seem odd that the case was heard en banc in light of
the fact that the issue raised in Lehr v. Robinson was never discussed
in the opinion. The last dissent, that of Judge Barfield, which expresses
this view, was never rebutted by the majority.2 93
V. CONCLUSION
It remains to be seen what impact the new Justice Reform Act of
1990 will have on delinquency matters in Florida's courts. The state's
current fiscal problems will make it more difficult to judge the impact
of the law in the near term. Independent of the new statute, the appel-
late courts continue to chide the trial courts for failure to comply with
289. Id. at 689.
290. D.J.S., 563 So. 2d at 689.
291. Id. at 690 (describing the statutory provisions in detail).
292. Id. at 699.
293. Id. at 700. According to Judge Barfield:
No where in the majority opinion is there a statement of the issue of
exceptional importance upon which this case was considered en banc. Ref-
erence is made to the order of supplemental briefing which suggested that
the court was concerned about the application of [Lehr v. Robinson], but
no suggestion is made that this court passed upon this matter en banc. Of
course, it could not be because no issue of abandonment was ever present
and none could be created.
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rudimentary statutory obligations. Undoubtedly, these appellate lec-
tures will continue under the new law.
On the dependency side, in addition to expressing similar concerns
about obvious failures to comply with statutory authority, the appellate
courts continue to express concern about the right to counsel provided
by statute to parents in termination cases. Most of the intermediate
appellate courts approve of the doctrine of prospective neglect, al-
though the subject awaits full resolution by the Florida Supreme Court.
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